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Rail Transportation for Ohio Agriculture 
Introduction 
In 1977, 443.3 million bushels of grain were shipped from 
Ohio to grain deficit areas in the United States and to foreign 
export facilities (Table 1). This volume is nearly double t~at 
of 1970 when 227.1 million bushels were shipped from Ohio. Of 
all 1977 grain movements from Ohio to out-of-state destinations, 
more than half (52.3%) moved by railroad. Although it is no sur-
prise to most people that railroads play a vital role in the grain 
marketing system, the continued growth of the export grain market 
and the advantages of speed and energy-efficiency in shipping com-
modities by rail have raised the importance of railroads to new 
levels for agriculture. 
This report will review the Ohio railroad network as it serves 
Ohio agriculture. A general description of the Ohio rail system 
will be followed by analysis of the primary issues of concern to 
agricultural railroad users. Issues to be discussed include the 
Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981 and its effect on railroad 
abandonment, the initial impacts of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 
~n deregulating the railroad industry, and whether the level of 
s~ate and federal government intervention in the railroad industry 
should be increased or decreased. 
Ohio Rail System 
With approximately 6,775 milles of track in its system, the 
Ohio rail network has more track mileage per square mile than any 
other state in the nation. Of the 29 railroad companies operating 
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Table 1: Grain and Oilseed Shipments to Out-of-State 
Destinations by Mode of Transportation as 
Reported by Elevator and Grain Processing 
Firms in Ohio, 1977 
MOD E 0 F T R A N S P 0 R T A T I 0 N 
Commodity Truck Rail Water Total 
- - (000 bu.) - - - -
Corn 11,290 163,592 113,397 288,279 
Soybeans 4,961 42,222 54,245 101,428 
Wheat 5,662 21, 720 17,201 44,583 
Oats 3,079 5,970 0 9,049 
Total Grain 24,992 233,504 184,843 443,339 
Source: Hennen, et al. 
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in Ohio, ten are classified as Class I carriers (any carrier with 
annual total gross revenues of more than $50 million) , 4 are Class II 
or Class III "line haul" carriers (total gross revenues of $10 mil-
lion-$50 million and under $10 million, respectively), and 15 are 
switching terminal companies (Table 2). However, the four major 
Class I carriers (Conrail, Norfolk and Western, Chessie!f and 
Detroit, Toledo and Ironton) operate over 91 percent of the track 
in Ohio. 
Table 3 gives the most recent financial information on the 
primary rail carriers in Ohio. It is interesting to note that 
only Conrail shows a net income loss for the years 1978 and 1979. 
The fact that every other primary rail carriP.r in Ohio has been 
making money dispells a common belief held by the general public 
that most railroads today are money losers. 
The United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) pro-
vides the following classification system used in identifying the 
traffic densities.of Ohio railroad lines. Figure 1 depicts Ohio's 
railroad lines under these standards. 
A-Mainline • 
B-Mainline • 
A-Branchline 
B-Branchline • 
System Classification 
20 million or more gross tons per year 
Less than 20 million gross tons but at 
least 5 million gross tons per year 
Between 1 and 5 million gross tons per 
year 
Less than 1 million gross tons per year 
Rail shipments of 12 different types of commodites represent 
96 percent of the total rail tonnage originating and/or terminating 
!/The Chessie System is the result of a merger between the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway. 
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Table 2: Railroad Mileage Operated in Ohio, December 31, 1977 
Railroad 
(January 1978 consist of roads) 
CLASS I LINE-HAUL RAILROADS: 
Baltimore & Ohio RR 
Bessemer & Lake Erie RR 
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. 
Cincinnati, New Orleans & 
Tex. Pac. Ry. 
Consolidated Rail Corp. 
Detroit, Toledo & Ironton 
RR 
Louisville & Nashville RR 
Norfolk & Western Ry. 
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie RR 
Ann Arbor RR 
Total Class I 
CLASS II AND III LINE-
HAUL RAILROADS: 
Akron, Canton & Youngstown 
RR Co, 
Detroit & Toledo Shore 
Line RR 
Lorain & West Virginia Ry. 
Youngstown & Southern Ry. 
Total Class II and III 
Total Class I, II 
and III 
* Less than 0.05 percent 
** Less than 1/2 mile. 
Miles Operated 
Entire Within 
Line state 
5404 
221 
4883 
371 
19222 
588 
6636 
7554 
274 
292 
45153 
171 
50 
25 
49 
295 
45456 
1672 
5 
413 
2 
3167 
463 
2 
1564 
86 
4 
7374 
171 
4 
25 
42 
242 
7624 
(Continued on next page) 
Percent 
operated 
within 
state 
30.9 
2.3 
8.5 
0.5 
16.5 
78.7 
* 
20.7 
31.4 
1.4 
16.3 
100.0 
8.0 
100.0 
85.7 
82.0 
16.8 
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Table 2: Cont'd 
December 31, 1977 
Railroad 
(January 1978 consist of roads) 
SWITCHING AND TERMINAL COMPANIES 
* 
** 
Akron & Barberton Belt RR 
Atchison Bridge Co. 
Cleveland Union Terminal Co. 
Covington & Cincinnati 
Elevated RR & Transfer 
l3ridge Co. 
Cuyahoga Valley Ry. 
Dayton Union Ry. 
fairport, Painesville & 
Eastern RR 
Lake Erie & Eastern RR 
Lake Terminal RR 
Lakef ront Dock & Railroad 
Terminal Co. 
Newburgh & South Shore Ry. 
River Terminal Ry. 
Toledo Terminal RR 
Union Depot Co. 
Youngstown i Northern 
Total Swi~ching 
Less than 0.05 percent. 
Less than 1/2 mile. 
RR 
Source: Ohio Rail Transportation Authority 
Miles operated 
Entire Within 
Line State 
42 42 
** ** 12 12 
5 2 
14 14 
9 9 
20 20 
128 128 
21 21 
61 61 
41 41 
28 28 
74 74 
3 3 
6 6 
464 461 
Percent 
operated 
within 
state 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
40.0 
100.0 
100. 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
99.4 
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Table 3: 1979 Financial Characteristics of Major Class I Ohio Railroads 
(dollar figures stated in thousands OOO's) 
(dollar figures stated in thousands 000'~) 
RAILROAD OPERATING REVENUES OPERATING EXPENSES OPERATING RATIO NET INCOME 
1978 1979 1978 1979 1978 1979 1978 1979 
B&O 830,746 922,248 770,856 857 I 172 92.8 92.9 52,029 56,068 
B&LE 92,776 121,449 61,684 83,622 66.5 68.9 16,806 19,833 
C&O 672,110 812,635 660,390 746,494 98.3 91. 9 68,865 118' 129 
CONRAIL 3,310,637 3,370,466 3,990,607 4,260,552 120.5 113. 0 (681,464) (487,631) 
DT&I 70,977 64,264 67,636 80,857 95.2 96.0 3' 104 3,130 
N&W 996,476 1,430,894 880,008 1,124,510 88.3 78.6 167,597 198,596 
P&LE 65,865 78,956 50,548 58,095 76.8 73.6 1,101 11,260 
Source: Ohio Rail Transportation Authority 
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Figure 1: Ohio's Mainline and Branchline System 
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in Ohio. Table 4 indicates the distribution of rail shipments 
in Ohio for each of these major commodities. Coal and metallic 
ores make up 54 percent of total rail tonnage for the top twelve 
conunodites while rail tonnage for each of the remaining ten com-
modities averages only 4.5 percent. Farm products comprise only 
4 percent of major rail commodity movements. 
Ohio is a net importer of rail-shipped goods primarily be-
cause the state receives approximately 50 percent of its annual 
coal requirements from out-of-state sources (Table 5) • This 
high demand for imported coal sterns from environmental restric-
tions which limit the use of the high sulphur content coal mined 
in Ohio. 
Revenue Densities Among Commodities 
The Ohio Rail Transport Authority (ORTA) reports that in 1978 
farm pro1ucts generated only 1.7 cents per ton mile. Coal and ore 
shipments are also low-revenue commodities, generating 2.6 and 3.3 
cents per ton mile respectively. High revenue items such as trans-
portation equipment (9.2 cents per ton mile) and scrap (6.1 cents 
per ton mile) helped raise the average revenue for all 1978 Ohio 
rail shipments to 3.7 cents per ton mile. 
ORTA points out that the variability in revenue density among 
commodities is especially significant for marginal rail carriers. 
A carrier seeking ways to cut costs will closely evaluate the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of continuing branchline service for 
farm products and other low-revenue items. 
Unit Train Operations in Ohio 
The concept of transporting bulk commodities by unit train 
- ---- - - ·--- -- ------- -------- --·---------- --- - -
------
-- - -
'I 
Table 4: Major* Rail Commodity Movements in Ohio 
s:ro: Code c.cmnooity Inbound tons % I/B Outbound tons % o/B Intrast. tons % I/S Total % Total 
01 Fann products '235,800 ... 5,858,500 11 175,900 1 6,270,200 .; 
10 Metallic ores 1,795,100 3 19,251,200 35 7,179,300 32 28,225,600 20 
11 Coal 38,933,600 62 3,777,200 7 :4,688,700 21 47,399,500 34 
14 rnn-rnetallic 
minerals, exc. 
fuel 1,877,000 3 4,226,500 B 2,134,300 10 8,237,800 6 
20 food kindred 
products 2,479,200 4 2,544,200 5 309,100 1 5,332,500 4 
26 p..ilp, paper 
allied prod. 2,638,500 4 840,900 2 21,200 ... 3,500,600 
28 Chemicals, allied 
prod. 3,681,000 6 2,437,700 4 759,300 3 6,878,000 5 
29 petroleum, roal l.Q 
produces 2,396,100 4 2,595,000 5 1,026,400 5 6,017,500 4 
32 clay, roncrete, 
glass, stone 2,167,100 3 2,438,500 4 134,400 1 4,740,000 3 
33 primary metal 
products 2,997,500 5 5,544,900 10 3,168,900 14 11,711,300 8 
37 transportation 
equipnent 1,693,300 3 3,929,700 7 244,800 1 5,867,800 4 
40 waste, scrap 
materials 2,073,800 3 1,765,700 3 2,571,800 11 6,411,300 5 
'.IO'mLS 62,968,000 100 55,210,000 100 22,414.100 100 140,592,100 100 
·• U Major ComOOities noved in Ohio in 1978; acoounts far 96% total rail tonnage in Ohio. 
Source: 1978 IO: 1% Waybill Sample 
Source: Ohio Rail Transportation Authority -
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Table 5: Ohio Coal Use by Source, 1970 - 1977 
(Thousand Short Tons) 
~ 
Western Eastern Total Ohio Total 
Year Coal Coal~. Imports Coal _use 
- -
1970 0 31,822 31,822 35,553 67,375 
1971 0 29,513 29,513 33,603 63,116 
1972 0 21,665 21,665 35,130 67,795 
1973 0 32,348 32,348 33,409 65,557 
1974 1,172 35,426 36,598 33,044 69,642 
1975 1,433 33,118 34,551 33,468 68,019 
1976 3,372 32,191 35,563 35,401 70,964 
1977 4,841 33,051 37,892 36,240 74,132 
* Excludes Ohio 
Source: Energy Data Reports, U.S. Department of Energy 
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has gained widesprP.ad popularity in recent years. The consider-
able energy and handling efficiencies gained in moving bulk items 
in unbroken 50-100 car "units" from one origin to one destination 
have caused the number of unit train grain loading facilities in 
Ohio to double since 1976. 
The primary reason for the proliferation of unit train grain 
loading stations is the fact that increased diesel fuel prices 
have decreased the maximum distance a commodity can be shipped by 
truck before trucking costs become prohibative. For example, in 
1978 when the price of diesel fuel was approximately 40 cents per 
gallon, a grain shipper could afford to truck grain as far as 78 
miles to a water port in Ohio before trucking costs would become 
excessive. A shipper who was more than 78 miles away from a water 
port would have been better off delivering grain to a nearby rail 
shipper. In 1979, diesel fuel prices averaged 62 cents per gallon 
and the maximum trucking distance was reduced to 69 miles. An 86 
cents per gallon average in 1980 made it economical to truck grain 
only 61 miles before rail became the optimal mode of transportation. 
It is likely that the price of diesel fuel coui_d increase to $2.00 
per gallon by 1984. At this price the break-even distance would 
decrease further to 39 miles. 
Table 6 lists unit train facilities for grain in Ohio for 
1980. Most large grain firms have plans to build more of these 
facilities in coming years. Even grain firms in the water port 
cities of Cincinnati and Toledo are using unit trains to increase 
capabilities to ship grain to many different markets. In Toldeo 
the presence of unit train facilities is especially significant 
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Table 6: Unit Train Loading Stations For Grain In Ohio, 1980 
Location (County) 
1. Alger (Hardin) 
2. Arcanum (Darke) 
3. Bellevue (Huron) 
4. Bloomingburg (Fayette) 
5. Botkins (Shelby) 
6. Cincinnati (Hamilton) 
7. Cincinnati 
8. Cincinnati 
9. Columbus (Franklin) 
10. Columbus 
11. Columbus 
12. Coshocton (Coshocton) 
13. Findlay (Hancock) 
14. Fostoria (Hancock) 
15. Grafton (Lorain) 
16. Harpster (Wyandot) 
17. Huron (Erie) 
18. Jeffersonville (Fayette) 
19. Kenton (Hardin) 
20. Latty (Paulding) 
21. Lilly Chapel (Madison) 
22. Lima (Allen) 
23. Mansfield (Richland) 
24. Marion (Marion) 
25. Mechanicsburg (Champaign) 
26. Metamora (Fulton) 
27. Montpelier (Williams) 
28. Sidney (Shelby) 
29. South Charleston (Clark) 
30. Toledo (Lucas) 
31. Toledo 
32. Toledo 
33. Troy (Miami) 
34. Uniopolis (Auglaize) 
35. Urbana (Champaign) 
Firm 
Ohio Farmers, Inc. 
Continental Grain Co. 
Central Soya Co., Inc. 
Queen City Grain, Inc. 
Botkins Grain & Feed Co. 
Central Soya Company, Inc. 
Early & Daniel Company 
Indiana Grain-Queen City Elev. 
Continental Grain Co. 
International Multifoods 
Landmark, Inc. 
Coshocton Grain Company 
Hochstettler Grain Co. 
Ohio Farmers, Inc. 
Landmark, Inc. 
The Pillsbury Co. 
The Pillsbury Co. 
Fayette Landmark, Inc. 
Landmark, Inc. 
Landmark, Inc. 
The Pillsbury Co. 
Cargill, Inc. 
Ohio Farmers, Inc. 
Central Soya Co., Inc. 
The Ohio Grain Co., Inc. 
The Metamora Elevator Co. 
Williams Landmark, Inc. 
Landmark, Inc. 
Clark Landmark, Inc. 
The Andersons, Inc. 
Cargill, Inc. 
Mid-States Terminals 
Continental Grain Col 
Auglaize Landmark, Inc. 
Champaign Landmark, Inc. 
Source: Pioneer Hybrid International, Inc. 
Storage 
Capacity 
(1000 bu.) Carrier 
900 
775 
5,700 
930 
800 
4,200 
12,066 
1,733 
2,900 
1,250 
5,600 
1,100 
1,750 
7,500 
750 
1,500 
1,900 
1,200 
1,050 
1,200 
1,600 
2,150 
1,250 
5,000 
2,542 
955 
1,350 
1,400 
1,300 
17,000 
4,900 
9,000 
2,270 
725 
1,050 
Cr 
BO 
NW 
BO 
BO 
CR 
B+O 
B+o 
NW 
CR 
CR 
CR 
NW 
BO/NW 
BO/CR 
co 
CR 
DTI 
CR 
NW 
CR 
CR 
BO/CR 
CR 
CR 
DTI 
NW 
CR 
CR/DTI 
CR 
NNW 
BO 
BO 
DTI 
CR 
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because grain firms there are no longer forced to store grain dur-
ing the winter season when the Great Lakes system is impassable. 
At least one Toledo firm has plans to build unit train loading 
stations in southcentral and southeastern Michigan. According to 
the nature of the demand for grain, these trains could either 
transport grain to water facilities at Toledo or proceed to ex-
port facilities on the east coast. 
Table 7 lists unit train facilities for coal shipments which 
originate and/or terminate in Ohio. Coal dominates unit train 
movements in Ohio, accounting for 49 percent of all unit train 
shipments. Most of this coal moves from mines to power plants in 
Michigan or Ohio. 
The advent of the unit train has altered the role of the 
small country elevator in the Ohio grain marketing system. In 
many areas the railroads consider branchline service to small 
volume grain shippers to be uneconomical. Until the 1980 Staggers 
Rail Act was passed, railroads were forced by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC) to maintain almost all branchline service. 
To reduce losses on uneconomical lines, railroads deferred main-
tenance and allowed service to detP.riorate to a point where many 
grain shippers switched from rail to trucking. 
With the passage of the Staggers Act and the Northeast Rail 
Service Act of 1981, rail abandonment has been accelerated and 
many country elevators, faced with a loss in rail service, have 
been forced to make adjustments. Impact analysis studies have 
been done on the effects of rail abandonment on shippers and 
•• 
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Table 7: Unit Train Facilities for Coal That Originates or Terminates 
in Ohio, 1979 
CARRIER ORIGIN DESTINATION(S) CARS/TRAIN 
BO/CO Egypt, OH Essexville, MI 100 
CR Georgetown, OH Monroe, MI 85 
CR/CO Sunny Hill, OH w. Olive, MI 107 
CR Powhatan, OH Midland, MI 100 
CR Riedsburg, PA Ashtabula, OH 70 
CR Horeb Church, PA Willoughby, OH 100 
CR Powhatan, OH Willoughby, OH 
CR Nacco, OH Willoughby, OH 
MGA/CR Fairview, w. Va. Ashtabula, OH 75 
MTR/CR Champion, PA Ashtabula, OH 75 
N&W S .E., OH N .E. I OH 105 
Source: Ohio Rail Transportation Author!tv 
.. 
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communities which have lost rail service. Larson and Vogel~/ 
found that the abandonment of 17 light density lines in central 
and western Ohio would have very little impact on aggregate grain 
transportation costs. Grain transportation costs were expected 
to increased by only $253,197.00 which is less than one-half of 
1 percent of the total annual cost of moving grain produced in 
the 31 county area of the study. The alternative to abandonment 
was t0 upgrade and continue service with nearly $4 million in 
subsidies which the Ohio Department of Transportation Branch Line 
Plan estimated would have been needed for 1976 alone. Larson and 
Vogel's survey detected few, if any, examples of shippers which 
were "captive" to rail services, as few firms stated they would 
incur a substantial increase in transportation costs due to aban-
donment. 
Baumel, Miller, and Drinka suggest in their study of several 
Iowa communities which have had several years to adjust to rail 
line abandonments there was no compelling evidence to indicate 
permanent commercial damage to the. communities involved.l/ Most 
businesses which previously had utilized rail services are now re-
ceiving and shipping merchandise by truck. 
~/Donald W. Larson and Robert C. Vogel. "Railroad Abandon-
ment: Optimal Solutions and Policy Outcomes." Chapter IV in 
Economic Regulation: Essays in Honor of James R. Nelson. William 
G. Shepherd and Kenneth D. Boyer (ed). East Lansing, Michigan 
State University Press, Forthcoming, 1981 
lie. Phillip Baumel, John J. Miller, and Thomas P. Drinka, 
An Economic Analysis of Upgrading Branch Lines: A Study of 71 
Lines in Iowa, (Ames: Iowa State University, March 1976), pp. 181, 
182. 
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In conversations with operators of Ohio agricultural firms 
which had lost or were about to lose rail service, this writer 
found that most firms were amenable to the movement away from 
light density branchline rail service. For the most part, these 
firms expected to continue to do business by utilizing trucking 
services. Many county elevators which have lost rail service, now 
serve as collection points for grain from where truckloads can be 
shipped to unit train loading stations. 
Not all grain elevators and shippers in Ohio have been will-
ing to give up rail service when the railroads have proposed aban-
donment. The Spencerville-Elgin rail line, running from Lima to 
Wren and Ohio City to Rockford, is a prime example of shipper 
efforts to maintain rail service. With aid from funds provided 
by the Rail Service Continuation Assistance Program!/ the Spencerville-
Elgin Railroad, a short-line company, has leased the track from 
the Erie-Lackawanna Railroad since 1978. Under this arrangement 
the Federal government paid 70 percent of the deficit resulting 
from line operation. Only weeks before October 1, 1981 when the 
federal subsidy was scheduled to end, the track was sold to ORTA 
for $3.8 million. ORTA purchased the line with 10 percent state 
and 90 percent federal funds to "allow continued freight service 
to agri-business shippers in northwest Ohio." 
The purchase by ORTA of the S-E line was intended to eliminate 
the $1,300 per day cost of leasing the line. ORTA reasoned that 
!/The RSCAP was a federal program instituted under the Regional 
Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (3R Act) and extended under Title 
VIII of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 
1976 (4R Act). 
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without the lease cost burden the railroad can become viable. 
Under the prese~t agreement, ORTA will hold the line for one 
year, after which the Spencerville-Elgin Railroad company must 
pay back the state's share of the purchase price. The federal 
share does not have to be paid back as long as the line remains 
viable. If the line fails, it will be sold and the proceeds 
will be used to pay off the federal portion. 
Several agri-business owners in Allen and Van Wert counties 
where the S-E line is located are opposed to ORTA's plan. This 
group feels the S-E rail line cannot be viable without some form 
of government subsidies and the cost of these subsidies event-
ually will be reflected in higher local taxes. ORTA points out 
that if the S-E line cannot be sold to private interests, the 
scrap value of the line is sufficient to at least recover the 
state and federal monies used to buy the line. According to ORTA, 
this element of scrap value safeguards the public interest. 
Rail abandonment and the role of government in the railroad 
industry are both controversial and complex issues. Further 
attention will be given to these topics later in this report. 
Impacts of the Staggers Act on Ohio Agriculture 
In an attempt to improve the competitive capabilities of 
the railroad industry, the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 was signed 
into law by President Jimmy Carter on October 14, 1980. 
Majors items of consideration in the Staggers Rail Act of 
1980 are as follows:~/ 
~c. Phillip Baumel, Staggers' First Impact: Reduced Rates, 
Grain Journal, July 10, 1981. 
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- Permits the railroads to change rates up or down within 
specified rail revenue to variable cost ratios provided 
20 days notice be given for rate increases and 10 days 
for rate decreases. 
- Railroads are permitted to increase rates quarterly to 
recover inflation-induced costs. 
- Permits the railroads to make surcharges on traffic 
originating or terminating on certain light density rail 
lines. 
- Legalizes contracts between railroads and shippers. 
- Sets a maximum time limit - 330 days after application -
for rail abandonment proceedings. Criteria for abandon-
ments wasn't changed. 
Limits ICC authority to issue car service orders to where 
it finds equipment shortages, traffic congestion, or other 
failures which have an adverse effect on rail service in 
the United States. 
Prohibits railroad companies from discussing, voting, or 
agreeing on single line rates or joint rates except with 
a rail carrier that forms a part of a particular single 
route. 
Since the Staggers Act,' railroads have taken advantage of its 
increased rate flexibility provisions. This has resulted in a 
positive impact on railroad earnings. According to the Association 
of American Railroad, U.S. railroad companies reported ordinary in-
come of $636.4 million in the first quarter of 1981, compared with 
$263.0 million for the same period in 1980. 
Since the passage of the Staggers Act, railroad rates have 
become more volatile and complex. With increased rate-making flex-
ibility, railroads are better able to react to changing conditions 
in the transportation industry. For example, the current slowdown 
in the U.S. economy has resulted in declining industrial traffic 
and depressed truck and barge rates. Under the Staggers Act, the 
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railroads are able to react to low barge and truck rates by low-
ering selected rates of their own. In the past, the time con-
straint of having to receive ICC approval for all rate changes 
hindered the abilities of railroads to react quickly to market 
conditions. Railroads were also reluctant to lower rates because 
they had no assurance rates could be raised once they had been 
lowered. 
Unit Train Rates Remain Competitive 
Changes in the rail rate structure since the passage of 
Staggers have had both positive and negative effects on agricul-
tural shippers. Unit train rates, for example, have remained very 
competitive. Conrail unit train rates for grain moving from 
Columbus to East Coast export facilities are generally lower for 
1981 than they were in 1980. Table 8 is a 1980 Conrail schedule 
of unit train rates (100-car) for grain moving from Columbus to 
export facilities in Albany, Philadelphia or Baltimore. At thar 
time Conrail charged the same rate for every trip but the rate 
went down according to the total number of trips a shipper had 
contracted. 
Table 9 gives sample rates from Conrail's October 1981 rate 
schedule for 100-car unit trains carrying grain from Columbus to 
East Coast export destinations. The design of the 1981 rate 
schedule is different in that the rate for each additional trip 
is slightly lower than the rate for the previous trip. Grain 
shippers have found this system to be more complicated than the 
sa~e-rate-for-every-trip plan which Conrail formerly offered. 
What causes complications is that average rates must be calculated 
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Table 8: Conrail Unit Train Rates (100-car) For Grain Moving From Columbus, 
Ohio to Export Facilities in Albany, Philadelphia, or Baltimore, 
April 1980 (Pre-Staggers). (Railroad Owned Equipment) 
Grain 
Rate 
Source: Conrail 
5 - 19 
12.80 
Number of Trips Per year 
20-29 30-34 35-44 45 and over 
- - - - Dollars Per Ton - -
12.40 12.00 11.80 11.60 
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Table 9: Sample Trip Rates From Conrail's Sliding Rate Schedule for Grain 
Unit Trains (100-car) Moving From Columbus, Ohio to Export Facilities 
in Albany, Philadelphia, or Baltimore, October, 1981. (Railroad 
Owned Equipment) 
T R I P NUMBER 
1 2 . 3 4 5 •. 10 .. 20... 30.. 40 .. 4 ') 
- Dollars Per Ton 
Grain 
Rate 13.13 13.07 13.00 12.94 12.88 11.99 11.34 10.41 9.33 8.87 
Source: Conrail 
Table 10: Average Rates Per Trip for Grain Shippers Using Conrail's Sliding Rate 
Schedule for Unit Trains (100-car) Moving From Columbus, Ohio to Export 
Facilities in Albany, Philadelphia, or Baltimore, October, 1981. 
(Railroad Owned Equipment) 
Grain 
Rate 
Source: Conrail 
5 
13. 00 
10 
12.56 
N U M B E R 
15 20 
0 F 
25 30 
T R I P S 
35 
- - - - Dollars Per Ton -
12.31 12.10 11.91 11. 70 11.46 
40 45 
11. 22 10. 98 
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whenever a shipper makes decisions involving unit train shipments. 
Under Conrail's sliding rate schenule a shipper's average costs 
per trip are not immediately evident. Table 10 gives the averaqe 
costs per trip according to the number of trips made. This table 
can be used to compare 1981 unit train rates with the 1980 unit 
train rates in Table 8. 
The Chessie Railroad offers 65-car unit train rates of $11.98 
per ton with a 60 trip minimum. The N & W offers 60 trip minimum 
rates for 100-car shipments of $11.81 per ton. At first glance, 
the Conrail average rate for 45 trips of $10.98 per ton makes 
Conrail the least expensive railroad on which to ship grain. But 
in order to enjoy the 45 trip average rate a shipper on Conrail 
must make all 45 trips within one year, using the same set of 
train equipment. The average turn-around time for a train making 
45 trips in one year is 8 days. Ohio grain shippers report that 
it is practically impossible to make 45 trips to the east coast 
annually with a single set of equipment. A more realistic number 
is 35-37 trips. The Chessie and N & W allow four sets of train 
equipment to be used in making the 60 trip minimum. The increased 
availability of equipment results in a smoother, more continuous 
flow of operations for grain shippers. This factor makes the 
Chessie and the N & W very competitive with Conrail in attract-
ing unit train shippers. 
It should be noted, however, that high volumes of grain are 
needed in order to take advantage of the rate discounts offered 
by the railroads. Careful planning by even the largest Ohio grain 
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firms is necessary to ensure grain availability at the proper 
times so unit train discounts can be captured. 
Domestic Grain Rates Generally Higher 
Rates for domestic grain shipments are more complicated and 
generally higher since the Staggers Act was passed. Conrail has 
cancelled all joint rates for shipments wrich switch from Conrail 
to another line or vice versa. A joint rate is e single rate a 
shipper pays for a commodity shipment which must utilize the ser-
vices of more than one railroad company. Joint rates are usually 
lower than the sum of the point-to-point rates each railroad nor-
mally charges for traffic on a particular line segment. Conrail 
attempted to capture more customers by making it more expensive 
to switch to other railroads along a route. As a result, ship-
pers using Conrail must either pay the higher cost of paying sev-
eral rates for a single shipment or allow Conrail to route traffic 
along Conrail lines - a plan which inevitably calls for longer 
shipping times. 
Another factor which has affected the cost of shipping grain 
is increased switching charges. While not directly related to 
the Staggers Act, the increase in switching charges has certainly 
been encouraged by railroad deregulation. In the past two years 
the fee for switching traffic from one railroad to another has 
gone up from $90 per car to $177 per car. Switching charges have 
been increased to the point where the number of options available 
to a shipper could be substantially limited. Shippers fear that 
switching charges will go beyond the ~oint of recovering costs and 
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become retaliatory measures used by railroad companies against one 
another. This contingency would be harmful to shippers and car- ~ 
riers alike. 
Changing Rates and Railroad Contracts 
Grain is often sold 2-3 months in advance. A seller's pro-
fits are determined by a narrow margin which exists between the 
selling price and the costs of buying and shipping the grain to 
the buyer. If transportati~n costs increase during the 2-3 month 
period before the grain is shipped, a seller's profits can be 
wiped out. The enhanced rate-making flexibility given to the rail-
roads by the Staggers Act has increased the risk that shipping 
rates could change on short notice. 
Under Staggers, shippers have the right to sign contracts 
with railroads and lock in a rail rate. But grain shippers who 
sign a contract with a railroad lose some potential to benefit 
from changes in the grain market. Grain supplies are not always 
sure and a shipper who signs a specific origin-destination con-
tract 2-3 months in advance, runs the risk of defaulting on the 
contract if grain is not available. Railroad contracts do not aid 
shippers in the grain industry as,much as they do shippers in the 
coal industry; for example, where demand is predictable and supply 
is usually assured. 
The Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981 
Under the 4R Act of 1976 Federal government subsidies to 
Conrail were to end October 1, 1981. Since the Federal government 
owns the controlling stock in Conrail, President Reagan was plan-
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ning to order that the railroad be split up and sold to private 
interests. Protests by Conrail supporters eventually led to a 
compromise in the form of the Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981. 
The bill, which was signed into law August 13, 1981, gives Conrail 
two years to become profitable. 
The biggest impact the NRSA will have on Conrail concerns 
rail abandonment procedures. Section 1156 of the Act includes the 
following provisions: 
- Conrail is exempt from the ordinary abandonment proce-
dures under the Staggers Act of 1980 which other rail-
roads must follows. 
- Conrail is granted the authority to abandon a line 
within 90 days after an application is filed unless, 
within such a 90-day period, an offer of financial 
support is made from an interested party. 
- Interested parties are provided an opportunity to 
purchase at 75 percent of liquidation value, a line 
which has been approved for abandonment. The purchase 
offer must be made within a 120-day period following 
abandonment approval. Conrail must honor any such 
offer. 
The provisions listed above apply to all applications for 
abandonment filed by Conrail prior to December 1, 1981. After 
this date, Conrail must file a "Notice of Insufficient Revenues" 
for each line it wishes to abandon before it can file an abandon-
ment application. Essentially, this requirement extends the aban-
donment process an additional 90 days. The lines which are con-
sidered by Conrail to be "real losers" are expected to be the 
lines which are proposed for abandonment before December 1st. 
ORTA anticipates a flurry of abandonment applications before this 
cutoff date. 
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A party which offers to purchase a line within the 90 day 
period following a filing for abandonment must pay 100 percent of 
the total purchase price which Conrail has set. In doing so, the 
buyer has the option of purchasing only a portion of the line and 
no restrictions are placed on the sale. If a line is bought at 
75 percent of its liquidation value, the buyer must purchase the 
entire line and operate it for not less than 5 years after the 
sale. The proceeds from the liquidation of a line which was pur-
chased under this arrangement and was not operated for at least 
5 years after the purchase must be paid to the Federal government. 
Ohio Railroads Identified for Potential Abandonment 
Under the 4R Act, ICC classifications were created to force 
railroads to publicize their plans for railroad abandonment. This 
method of classification allows shippers, communities, and states 
to take appropriate action before a line is abandoned. The ICC 
categories created by the 4R Act are: 
Category I: lines anticipated to be abandoned 
in 3 years. 
Category II: lines under study for potential 
abandonment. 
Category III: lines pending abandonment. 
Category IV: lines operating under subsidy 
Category V: all other lines. 
Figure 2 shows the railroad lines in Ohio which have been 
considered for abandonment prior to the passage of the NRSA. 
Since the NRSA became law, Conrail has cancelled all previous 
abandonment plans and is currently preparing a new list of aban-
donment candidates. Some abandonment applications have already 
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.• Figure 2: Ohio Railroad Lines Considered for Abandonment, According to ICC Category 
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been filed. Figure 2 is intended to give the reader an indica-
tion of which lines Conrail has considered to be abandonment can-
didates in the past. Railroad lines not operated by Conrail should 
have the same category status as is indicated in Figure 2. 
The Role of Government in the Railroad Industry 
The NRSA removes from Conrail the burden of proof to show 
that a rail line is not viable. This legislation and other laws 
which have recently deregulated the transportation industry were 
passed on the premise that the forces of supply and demand would 
provide efficient and effective services to the public. In effect 
the Federal government is admitting that regulations which force 
a railroad to provide services to customers at articially low 
prices do not ensure high quality service. 
A railroad firm, like any investor, will allocate financial 
resources to the activity which provides the greatest return on 
investment. The rail company is not likely to provide the steady 
flow of capital needed to maintain the track and equipment of a 
rail line with a low return on investment. As maintenance is 
deferred over a number of years the quality of service deteriorates 
to a point where operations are both unsatisfactory and dangerous. 
The crisis situation which has been building for years arrives 
when the carrier finally proposes abandonment and shippers demand 
that rail service be upgraded and maintained. The abandonment 
which government regulations were designed to avert, now looms 
like never before. 
Congress' response to the railroad crisis of the 1970s was 
to enact subsidy programs and bail out railroads which otherwise 
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would have gone bankrupt. Many railroad lines, vital to U.S. in-
dustry and cormnerce were rescued by the 3R Act and the 4R Act. 
But problems resulted when the subsidy strategy and continued 
rate regulation increased dependence on the Federal government 
and decreased incentives to cut costs and compete with other 
transportation modes. The Staggers Act of 1980 and the Northeast 
Rail Service Act of 1981 are attempts by the government to finally 
remove the multi-billion dollar albatross which government inter-
vention had become. 
What are the roles of the national and state governments in 
the railroad industry? ORTA states its purpose is to provide 
sound and efficient rail freight transportation and develop a safe, 
efficient intercity rail passenger system for Ohio. But what makes 
rail transportation "sound" and "efficient"? Events of the past 
have shown that a railroad system which is privately owned but 
government subsidized is almost certain to be inefficient and un-
sound. 
The Ohio Constitution requires that shippers, rather than the 
state, pay the non-Federal share of rail service continuation sub-
sidies. Larson and Vogel.§/ state that this may have been an im-
portant factor contributing to the abandonment of non-economic 
rail lines in Ohio. Table 11 compares rail mileage in Ohio in the 
different ICC categories with the mileage in Indiana, where tax 
monies can be used to pay the non-Federal share of the subsidy. 
Total mileage for the two states is nearly equal, but Indiana has 
.§/Larson and Vogel, op. cit. 
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Table l~.: Rail Mileage by ICC Categories iri State Rail Plans 
for Ohio and Indiana as of August, 1978 
ICC Categories Ohio Indiana 
Total Rail Mileage 6,700 6,405 
Category I: anticipated to be 138.8 209.5 
abandoned in three years. 
Category II: under study for 154 270.9 
ROtential abandonment. 
Category III: pending abandonment. 185.8 133.5 
Category IV. operating under subsidy. 160 382.0 
Source: Larson and Vogel 
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more than twice as many miles operating under subsidy as Ohio. 
Moreover, Ohio has more miles pending abandonment, while Indiana 
has more miles in Categories I and II which seem more likely to 
end up operating under subsidy in the case of Indiana. The ques-
tion of who pays the non-Federal share of rail service continua-
tion subsidies and the impact on abandonment decisions is clearly 
an important issue for further study. 
Huge Tax Savings For Railroads Under 1981 Tax Law 
Railroads are receiving a different kind of help from the 
government as a result of the 1981 Tax Law. The new law permits 
railroads to start depreciating about $8 billion in rail track 
over periods ranging from 5 years to 50 years.?_/ The biggest por-
tion of the write-offs occur in 1981 and will reduce or eliminate 
the railroads' federal tax bills. The more profitable railroads 
are expected to depreciate track at a faster rate than marginally 
profitable rail companies. This is because the shorter the write-
off period, the bigger each year's income tax deductions will be. 
Hopefully the additional cash flows resulting from the new 
law will be used to upgrade rail facilities and reduce debt. The 
tax changes come at a time when railroads are just beginning to 
exercise the freedoms granted to them by the Staggers Act. If 
Staggers succeeds in protecting return on investment in the rail-
road industry, then railroad companies will channel bigger cash 
flows into railroad structure. 
2/"Tax Changes Give Railroads a Big Break." The Wall Street 
Journal, 27 October, 1981,i p. 47. 
I 
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A Time of Transition 
The railroad industry has undergone tremendous change in the 
last decade, especially in the last year with the advent of deregu-
lation. How well the industry will adjust to competition among 
railroad firms is yet to be seen. The future of Conrail remains 
an enigma. Increasing costs of energy will more strictly define 
the roles of trucking for short-distance hauls and rail and water 
movements for long-distance transport. The transitions now taking 
place in transportation are complex, challenging, and at times 
painful for shippers and carriers alike. Ohio agriculture can 
survive these transitions best by remaining flexible and innova-
tive, ready to benefit from new opportunities in transportation. 
I' 
• 
II 
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